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AN IMPACT ANALYSIS OF DFARS CLAUSE 252.242.7005 
ON CONTRACTOR BUSINESS SYSTEM APPROVAL 
AND DISAPPROVAL 
ABSTRACT 
This research attempted to quantify the impact to the government, contractor, 
and warfighter of the implementation of the Better Buying Power Initiative 3.0, 
and specifically, Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) 
clause 252.242.7005, Contractor Business Systems, which allowed for more 
stringent government oversight of contractors. Data was collected from 
Contract Business Analysis Repository (CBAR), which shows the contractor business 
systems’ approval or disapproval status. A qualitative analysis was then performed 
using DCMA business system compliance review reports, letters, and contractor 
data to verify significant deficiencies with business systems that led to system 
disapproval. This research details the significant deficiencies of this process, given that 
there were contractors with multiple business system disapprovals who are still 
actively contracting with the federal government, potentially affecting both 
government efficiency and warfighter readiness. Finding 1: Analysis of the CBAR data 
from 2015 and 2019 for the six contractor business systems revealed that once a 
business system is reapproved, there is no method for viewing historical data of past 
deficiencies. Finding 2: The data analysis revealed the lack of a responsibility tracking 
tool. Finding 3: The corrective action requests that were analyzed on the 
disapproved contractor business systems did not impact the urgent fielding of 
critical equipment. 
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In 2020, the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) celebrated two 
decades of delivering contract management support to the nation’s warfighters. DCMA 
reports to the under secretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment and is “a valued 
contributor to the greater national defense team, ensuring readiness and delivering 500 
million items to the warfighter annually” (Lewis, 2020, p. 3). According to the DCMA 
Insight Magazine, a yearly publication where the agency provides data related to its 
contract management role. DCMA’s role is primarily funded by the military or federal 
government (e.g., Department of the Army, Navy, Marines, Air Force, or NASA). The 
agency’s oversight role, as the first line of defense against fraud, waste, and abuse of 
taxpayer dollars, ensures that a contractor business system (CBS)1 is compliant. Since it 
has managed more than 300,000 contracts at 15,129 contractor facilities valued at $7.2 
trillion, there is a return on investment of two-to-one on every dollar invested (Tremblay, 
2020). This measure is critical in identifying fraud, waste, and abuse of taxpayer dollars. 
A notable change in contractor business systems occurred on February 24, 2012, 
when the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement [DFARS] Case 2009-D038, 
the final rule, became law for contractor business systems, as this provided a financial 
incentive for the contractor to maintain an approved business system. Prior to the 
enactment of the DFARS 252.242-7005, when a contractor had significant deficiencies 
with one or more business systems, as determined by DCMA or the Defense Contract Audit 
Agency (DCAA), the functional specialist would write and submit to the contractor officer, 
via the CAR eTool system, a corrective action request (CAR) that detailed the deficiencies. 
In some cases, these deficiencies caused a delay in fielding items to the warfighter. 
Additionally, the contractor was required to submit a corrective action plan (CAP) to the 
functional specialist who entered the CAP into the CAR eTool system. The CAP was 
tracked with the CAR and approved. The functional specialist analyzed objective evidence 
to validate CAP completion. The functional specialist submitted the CAP completion 
1 Contractor business system and CBS are used interchangably throughout the document. 
2 
verification data to the administrative contracting officer (ACO) for final determination of 
an approved system.2 While these actions worked to keep contractors accountable, 
particularly regarding their accounting systems, prior to the implementation of 252.242-
7005, there was little incentive for the contractor to correct any identified deficiencies. The 
exception to this was that if the accounting system was disapproved, it could, depending 
on the contract value and type, prevent the contractor from being awarded additional 
government contracts until it was reapproved. 
Notably, the law established the actions of assessing the new withholding clause, 
which calls for the withholding of a percentage of payment to the contractor until the 
situation is rectified. Specifically, “ACOs apply a 2 to 5 percent contract payment 
withholding for a single deficient system and a maximum of a 10 percent withhold when 
multiple systems were found to have significant deficiencies” (DFARS, 252.242-7005, 
2012, p. 5). In addition:  
“Significant deficiency,” in the case of a contractor business system  
[CBS] means a shortcoming in the system that materially affects the  
ability of officials of the Department of Defense to rely upon information 
produced by the system that is needed for management purposes.  
(DFARS 252.242-7005, 2012, p. 5) 
Without this kind of internal control mechanism to ensure that a contractor’s 
business system maintains its approval, there would be an increase in the risk of 
uncontrollable government contract cost. However, despite the clear benefits of these 
compliance efforts, an analysis of the six contractor business systems is necessary to further 
understand the comprehensive nature of the checks and balances and how they impact the 
government, contractors, and warfighters in practice.  
A. RESEARCH SCOPE 
The problem is to determine the impact of DFARS Subpart 252.242.7005 
Contractor Business System Clause after the April 9, 2015, implementation of Better 
Buying Power 3.0: Achieving Dominant Capabilities Through Technical Excellence and 
 
2 Contracting officer (CO) is used interchangeably with ACO throughout the document. 
3 
Innovation (Kendall, 2015). The research project data review, which included the years 
2015 to 2019, was essential to answering the primary and secondary research questions.  
Most importantly, answering the impact to the government, contractor, and warfighter 
related to DFARS clause 252.242.7005 Contractor Business Systems, disapproval. The six 
contractor business systems are as follows:  Earned Value Management Systems (EVMS), 
Contractor Property Management Systems, Contractor Purchasing Systems (CPSR), 
Accounting Systems, Cost Estimating Systems, and Material Management and Accounting 
Systems (MMAS). In addition, data analysis was conducted on surveillance reviews that 
were used to assess government compliance on contractors (DFARS 252.242-7005, 2012). 
Contractors for this research were selected based on significant deficiencies that then led 
to business system disapproval. The data were then analyzed regarding compliance, along 
with DCMA policy, oversight, and processes for performing contractor business system 
surveillance reviews and evaluating data integrity. It was further assessed according to 
Department of Defense [DOD] policy, FAR parts, DFARS clauses, and guidance. 
B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this research project was to quantify the impact to the government, 
contractor, and warfighter related to implementation of the DFARS clause 252.242.7005 
Contractor Business Systems.  
a. Primary Research Question  
What is the impact of recent changes to the compliance determination of the 
contractor business systems after the April 9, 2015, implementation of Better Buying 
Power 3.0: Achieving Dominant Capabilities Through Technical Excellence and 
Innovation (Kendall, 2015)? 
b. Secondary Research Question  
What has a direct impact to fielding supplies to the warfighter?  
4 
C. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology is a qualitative analysis using DCMA business system 
compliance review reports, letters, and contractor data to verify significant deficiencies 
with business systems that lead to system disapproval. Data for this thesis were collected 
and analyzed from Contract Business Analysis Repository (CBAR), which shows the 
contractor business systems’ status of approved or disapproved.3 The data from CBAR 
provides descriptive information that is entered by the CO to verify and validate the 
contractors’ business system status.  
This thesis presents research detailing the significant deficiencies of this process—
given that there were contractors with multiple business system disapprovals—and 
determines the impact of the contractor business systems clause, as well as warfighter 
readiness impacts due to delivery delays and nonconforming material. 
D. ORGANIZATION 
The research paper is categorized in a logical progression from contract receipt and 
review to the determination of contractor business system approval and disapproval, which 
answers the primary research question: What is the impact of recent changes to the 
compliance determination of the contractor business system?  
Chapter I provides the progression of the research proposal. It defines the 
importance of the thesis, scope, methodology, and organization. 
Chapter II provides fundamental conceptions of the contractor business system. 
Chapter III provides the data elements used in the contractor business system 
surveillance, analysis, reporting, and business system determination. 
Chapter IV examines six DOD programs using contractor business system 
compliance data indicators. It documents systems surveillance review results from the 
 
3 The Appendix provides additional information regarding the contractor business system rule contract 
application, the contract administrative functions, and the DCMA, FAR 42.302, and contract administration 
services (CAS).  
5 
systems functional specialist to the Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO). This 
determines the impact to the government, contractor, and warfighter related to DFARS 
252.242.7005. 
Chapter V provides the answer to the primary and secondary research questions. 
  
6 
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II. BACKGROUND 
To understand recent changes to the contractor business systems, it is important to 
go back to the efforts of Dr. Robert M. Gates and the publication of the Better Buying 
Power Initiative. Gates served as the U.S. secretary of defense from December 2006 to 
July 2011. President Barack Obama, the eighth president Gates served, was the only 
incoming president, in U.S. history, to ask the current secretary of defense to remain in  
office.. When Gates knew that he would remain in his position under Obama, he strategized 
how he would successfully implement his ideas into the budget (Gates, 2014). 
Gates’s highest mission priority was, first and foremost, the urgent fielding of 
critical supplies, services, and lifesaving equipment with better value and rapid fielding to 
the U.S. armed forces (Gates, 2014). On June 28, 2010, Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Dr. Ashton Carter sent a Better Buying Power 
mandate memorandum for acquisitions professionals (2010a, p. 1). He noted that in his 
previous written communication to the acquisition professionals, “to emphasize, with 
President Obama and Secretary Gates, that your highest priority is to support our forces at 
war on an urgent basis” (Carter, 2010a, p. 1).  
Gates’s most notable streamlining successes in government were long-lasting, and 
some even grew after his 2011 retirement. They include increasing the fielding rate of 
mine-resistant ambush protected vehicles; increased coverage of intelligence, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance (ISR); directing the creation of the U.S. Cyber Command; and directing 
the Better Buying Power initiative that continued after his retirement in 2011 through three 
memorandum updates, all of which are detailed below (Gates, 2014).  
On September 14, 2010, Carter sent a Better Buying Power guidance memorandum 
for acquisition professionals that he credited as President Obama and Secretary Gates’s 
highest priority. The guidance objective is as follows: 
Deliver better value to the taxpayer and warfighter by improving the way 
the Department does business. I emphasized that, next to supporting our 
forces at war on an urgent basis, this was President Obama’s and Secretary 
8 
Gates’s highest priority for the Department’s acquisition professionals. To 
put it bluntly: we have a continuing responsibility to procure the critical 
goods and services our forces need in the years ahead, but we will not have 
ever-increasing budgets to pay for them. We must therefore strive to achieve 
what economists call productivity growth: in simple terms, to DO MORE 
WITHOUT MORE. (Carter, 2010b, p. 1) 
A. THE CONTRACTOR BUSINESS SYSTEM IMPROVEMENTS 
The CBS improvements will show the impact to the government, contractor, and 
warfighter related to Defense Acquisition Regulations System (DFARS) 252.242.7005. 
The supplementary information in the proposed rule describes the importance of 
strengthening the weak internal control systems of government contractors. Most 
importantly, “contractor business systems and internal controls are the first line of defense 
against waste, fraud, and abuse. Weak control systems increase the risk of unallowable and 
unreasonable costs on Government contracts” (Defense Acquisition Regulations System 
[DARS], 2012). After this mandate was issued, several supporting memos and laws were 
also passed, including those detailed in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1.  Timeline of Government Streamlining and Oversight of Contractors.    
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Specifics of the timeline: 
• September 14, 2010: Ashton Carter issued a memorandum for acquisition 
professionals, Better Buying Power: Guidance for Obtaining Greater 
Efficiency and Productivity in Defense Spending (Carter, 2010b). The 
memorandum was guidance for achieving the June 28, 2010, Better Buying 
Power: Mandate for Restoring Affordability and Productivity in Defense 
Spending, that improves industry productivity and provides an affordable, 
value-added military capability to the warfighter (Carter, 2010a). 
• January 7, 2011: Under Ike Skelton, the National Defense Authorization 
Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 was enacted to provide additional 
oversight and accountability of government contractors. The guidance was 
covered in Section 831: “oversight and accountability of contractors 
performing private security”; Section 834: “enhancements of authority of 
the secretary of defense to reduce or deny award fees to companies found 
to jeopardize the health or safety of government personnel” (NDAA 
, 2011, pp. 138 and 142).  
• November 13, 2012: Under Secretary of Defense Frank Kendall issued a 
memorandum for acquisition professionals, Better Buying Power 2.0: 
Continuing the Pursuit for Greater Efficiency and Productivity in Defense 
Spending, that continued the DOD’s efforts toward increasing efficiencies, 
“do more without more” (2012, p. 1).  
• April 9, 2015: Kendall issued a memorandum for acquisition professionals, 
Implementation Directive for Better Buying Power 3.0: Achieving 
Dominant Capabilities through Technical Excellence and Innovation, that 
provided “the next step in our continuing effort to increase the productivity, 
efficiency, and effectiveness of the Department of Defense’s many 
acquisition, technology, and logistics efforts.” (2015, p. 1). 
B. THE FINAL BUSINESS SYSTEMS RULE 
After the NDAA was enacted on January 7, 2011, the final business system rule 
was formally adopted into law on February 24, 2012. It states: 
The final Business System rule is very similar to the interim rule published 
on May 18, 2011. Major system reviews have been performed by the federal 
government since 1985. Internal controls have been a major focus of the 
federal government for several years and have been paid even more 
attention since the adoption of FAR 52.203-13, Contractor Code of 
Business Ethics and Conduct (effective as of December 24, 2007). One of 
the stated criteria of FAR 52.203-13 was to create an internal control system 
that will facilitate timely discovery and disclosure of improper conduct in 
connection with government contracts. Over the next several years, internal 
control requirements slowly evolved into system-specific requirements for 
major Business Systems, as defined by the DOD (NDAA, 2011). 
10 
Importantly, the above rule provides clarification of the administration of contract 
oversight effectiveness of DCMA and DCAA over the six contractor business systems. 
C. ROLE OF THE DCMA AND DCAA IN CONTRACT MANAGEMENT 
The DCMA is the cognizant federal agency responsible for the management of 
contracts. Additionally, these laws and timelines directly affect the DCAA and DCMA as 
they are the government audit agencies responsible for surveillance and auditing of DOD 
contractor accounting systems. A DCMA or DCAA functional specialist issues a business 
system report, and they make compliance recommendations to DCMA through an audit 
report (FAR 42.101, 2020). 
DCMA issues a business system analysis summary (BSAS) for 
• Earned value management systems (EVMS; DFARS 252.234-7002) 
• Contractor property management systems (DFARS 252.245-7003) 
• Contractor purchasing systems (CPSR; DFARS 252.244-7001) 
DCAA issues a business system report (audit report) for 
• Accounting systems (DFARS 252.242-7006)  
• Cost estimating systems (DFARS 252.215-7002)  
• Material management and accounting systems (MMAS; DFARS 252.242-
7004) 
When the military or federal government (e.g., Department of the Army, Navy, 
Marines, Air Force, or NASA) awards a contract, if the program manager (PM) uses 
DCMA to manage the contract, the procurement contracting officer (PCO) will send a 
delegation authority to DCMA. The PCO can withhold all but FAR 42.302 (2020), Contract 
Administration Functions, to DCMA: 
The contracting officer normally delegates the following contract 
administration functions to a contract administration office [CAO]. The 
contracting officer may retain any of these functions, except those in 
paragraphs (a)(5), (a)(9), (a)(11) and (a)(12) of this section, unless the 
cognizant Federal agency (see 2.101) has designated the contracting officer 
to perform these functions. (FAR 42.302, 2020) 
Applicable Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) “is divided into subchapters, 
parts (each of which covers a separate aspect of acquisition), subparts, sections, and 
subsections” (FAR 1.105-2, 2020), as well as DFARS clauses that are added to applicable 
11 
contracts. In addition to the clauses, DCMA directives, policies, manuals, and instructions 
are used to determine and mitigate risk with the contractor business systems. DCMA 
provides contract oversight, surveillance, and compliance processes when performing 
contractor business system compliance reviews and evaluating data integrity.  
It is DCMA policy to: 
• Ensure contractors maintain effective business systems, processes, and 
procedures. 
• Perform contractor business system reviews and determinations in a multi-
functional, integrated, synchronized, and coordinated manner. 
• Execute this [DCMA-MAN 2301–01] manual in a safe, efficient, 
effective, and ethical manner. (DCMA, 2019c, p. 5) 
On April 28, 2019, the DCMA Manual (DCMA-MAN) 2301–01, Contractor 
Business System, was published. It contains 10 sections and 
applies to all DCMA organizational elements who enable or perform 
contractor business system (CBS) review activities on DCMA administered 
contracts/non-procurement instruments, contracts awarded by DCMA, 
contracts with delegations (e.g., National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA), Foreign Military Sales, and other federal 
agencies), and Direct Commercial Sales, and section 1.2 Policy, states it is 
DCMA policy to: a. Ensure contractors maintain effective business systems, 
processes, and procedures; b. Perform contractor business system reviews 
and determinations in a multi-functional, integrated, synchronized, and 
coordinated manner; c. Execute this manual in a safe, efficient, effective, 
and ethical manner. (DCMA, 2019c, p. 5) 
D. SIX MAJOR CONTRACTOR BUSINESS SYSTEMS 
DFARS requires “contractors who do business with the federal government to 
maintain an approved business system; the contractors may have up to six business 
systems” that require approval” (GAO, 2019, p. 4). The DFARS establishes the execution 
of validation review criteria for each of the six business systems with a contract clause 
specific to the type and total dollar threshold value of the contract. The review and approval 
of a business system indicates the heath and compliance of the contractor’s program, and 
it reduces risk to the taxpayer, government, and contractor.  
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A summary, from the GAO report to Congressional Committees, of the descriptions 
and factors of the six contractor business systems is as follows: 
• Accounting: System review to determine current, “accurate, and timely 
reporting of financial data that is applicable to laws and regulations.” 
(GAO, 2019, p. 4) Factors: Contract types “include but are not limited to” 
cost-reimbursement, incentive, time and materials, etc. (GAO, 2019, p. 4). 
 
• Estimating: System review to determine estimating of cost and “data 
included in proposals submitted to the government” reflect proper policies, 
procedures, and practices (GAO, 2019, p. 4). Factors: Contracts that are 
awarded, but not limited to the evaluation of the “certified cost or pricing 
data” (GAO, 2019, p. 4). 
 
• Material Management and Accounting: System review of standalone or 
integrated internal tools used for planning the acquisition and use of 
material. Factors: Cost or “fixed-price contracts that exceed the simplified 
acquisition threshold” and have progress payments (GAO, 2019, p. 4). 
Non-applicable to nonprofits, small businesses, or educational institutions. 
 
• Purchasing: System or systems review for purchasing and subcontracting 
that include execution and delivery of materials through vendor selection, 
price quotes, and administration of orders. Factors: Certain contracts with 
FAR subcontracts clause that exceed the simplified acquisition threshold.  
 
• Property Management: System or systems used in “managing and 
controlling government property” (GAO, 2019, p. 5). Factors: Cost, fixed-
price, time and material, “or labor hour contracts that” include FAR 
clauses for government property (GAO, 2019, p. 5). 
 
• Earned Value Management: System review of program management tools 
and internal controls used to ensure government compliance with the 
integration of the scope of work to cost, schedule, and performance. 
Factors: Cost or incentive contracts subject to the EVM clause (GAO, 
2019, pp. 4–5). 
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III. DATA 
Data collected and analyzed from Contract Business Analysis Repository (CBAR) 
indicates which of the contractor business systems, enterprise-wide, have the 
“disapproved” status. The data also reveals the percentage of payments being withheld 
until the CO determination. The functional specialist then submits the verification and 
deficiency closure data, obtained during the DCMA business system review to the CO. The 
CO reviews the verification date to determine whether there are remaining significant 
deficiencies. When this is confirmed, the CO issues a letter of final determination of the 
contractor’s business system “approved” status.  
An analysis of the significant deficiencies of a contractor with multiple business 
system disapprovals will determine the impact of the contractor business systems clause, 
as well as warfighter readiness impacts due to delivery delays and nonconforming material.  
A. CONTRACTOR BUSINESS SYSTEM SURVEILLANCE 
On April 9, 2015, the issuance of Implementation Directive for Better Buying 
Power 3.0: Achieving Dominant Capabilities through Technical Excellence and Innovation 
provided implementation instructions to “increase the productivity, efficiency, and 
effectiveness of the DOD’s many acquisitions, technology, and logistics efforts” (Kendall, 
2015, p. 1). 
Since November 5, 2018, DCMA-MAN 2303, which was published by Vice 
Admiral Lewis, DCMA Director, was provided guidance in the execution of contractor 
business system surveillance events (DCMA, 2018a). This publication was issued in 
accordance with the authority in DOD Directive 5105.64 (DOD, 2013). It established the 
policy and responsibility for surveillance responsibilities assessing contractor business 
system risk. The risk assessment is used in the planning, execution, documentation, and 
feedback for business system surveillance (DCMA, 2018a). Surveillance is a contract 
administration requirement used by the functional specialist “to evaluate the contractor’s 
data on performance and contractual compliance to statutory and regulatory requirements” 
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(see Figure 2). Surveillance uses four steps to “assess risk, plan events, execute standard 
techniques, and document and provide feedback” to all stakeholders (DCMA, 2018a, p. 5). 
 
Figure 2. Surveillance Steps. Source: Adapted from DCMA (2018a, p. 5). 
DCMA’s guidance in conducting surveillance is to use the following manuals that 
support DCMA-INST-2303, Contractor Effectiveness Capability: 
• DCMA-MAN 2303–01, Surveillance: Assess Risk. This manual prescribes 
“the procedures for implementing a risk assessment process that will be 
used to plan surveillance events” (DCMA, 2018a, p. 5). 
• DCMA-MAN 2303–02, Surveillance: Plan Events. This manual provides 
“procedures for implementing a surveillance planning process that will be 
used to plan and schedule surveillance events” (DCMA, 2018a, p. 5). 
• DCMA-MAN 2303–03, Surveillance: Execute with Standard Techniques. 
“This manual standardizes surveillance terminology and surveillance 
techniques that will be used when planning and executing surveillance 
events” (see Figure 3) (DCMA, 2018a, p. 5). 
• DCMA-MAN 2303–04, Surveillance: Document Results, Corrective 
Actions & Provide Feedback (DCMA, 2019d). “This manual provides 
procedures for documenting surveillance event(s) completion, results, 
CAR, and feedback” (DCMA, 2018a, p. 5). 
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On April 28, 2019, Vice Admiral Lewis issued DCMA-MAN 2301–01 “in 
accordance with the authority in DOD Directive 5105.64” (2019c, p. 2), which provides 
instruction to the functional specialist on the process and procedures for contractor business 
system reviews and implements DCMA Instruction 2301, Evaluating Contractor 
Effectiveness (2019a, January 24). The issuance of DCMA-MAN 2301–01 detailed the 
responsibilities and procedures used in assessing the “approval or disapproval of the 
contractor’s system” (2019c, p. 2).  
 
 
Figure 3.  Surveillance Techniques in Support of Compliance 
Determination. Source: Adapted from DCMA (2018b, p. 10).  
B. SURVEILLANCE REPORTING AND DETERMINATION: OVERVIEW 
OF THE DCMA DISAPPROVAL PROCESS 
A summary of the DCMA-MAN 2303–03 disapproval process is as follows:  
• An analysis of the exhibits, contractual requirements, and contractor 
procedures with the noncompliance description from the corrective action 
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request (CAR) identifies the severity of the noncompliance and the impact 
it has on the contract, cost, schedule, and technical performance, as well as 
people, process, and tools.  
• The analysis of the data provided by the contractor, through a corrective 
action plan (CAP), provides the root cause of the significant deficiency, 
corrective action plan implementation schedule, and the prevention of 
reoccurrence.  
• The DCMA business system review functional specialist verifies the exit 
criteria, prevention of reoccurrence, and closure of the CAP.  
• Next, the DCMA business system functional specialist reviews the 
contractor business system and provides the documented findings to the 
administrative contracting officer (ACO) with a recommendation for 
business system disapproval, including a category of severity (Level I, II, 
III, or IV) and an approved CAP.  
• The ACO then issues a final determination for business system disapproval. 
If disapproved, a determination to withhold a percentage of payments can 
be made. 
• The contractor is then given the chance to rectify their deficiencies written 
in the CAR. Penalties are to be lifted or reduced until verification of a CAP 
has been completed and then closed. 
• Lastly, the ACO determines, with verification and validation of deficiency 
closure data, that there are no remaining significant deficiencies. A final 
CBS determination letter is then issued to the contractor on their reviewed 
system, changing their status from disapproved to approved (DCMA, 
2018b).  
 
This research project was based on contractors with a disapproved business system. 
The analysis was based on the documentation obtained from the DCMA CAR eTool system 
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and CBAR. The documentation included SSRs, CARs, and CAPs, as well as ACO 
determination, withholds, and closeout determination for CBS approval. A review of the 
DCMA system surveillance functional specialists’ contractor system surveillance report 
(SSR) reveals the FAR parts, DFARS clauses, DCMA policy, instruction, and processes 
that were used in evaluating and documenting contract progress and compliance (DCMA, 
2019c). 
The contractor’s data is assessed by contractual, regulatory, statutory, and internal 
process requirements. As noted, “all surveillance falls within one or more overarching 
surveillance categories: Process Evaluations, Progress Evaluations, and Deliverable 
Supplies/Service Evaluations” (DCMA, 2018e, p. 5). When significant deficiencies 
(noncompliance) are identified, a CAR is issued.  
Contracting officer determination of a business system disapproval for applicable 
Commercial and Government Entity (CAGE) codes, and any contracts that have the 
applicable clause under that CAGE code, would be subject to a withhold per DFARS 
252.242-7005. The government contractors’ CAGE code is tied to the site address of 
contract execution and entered into the CBAR. The CBAR data entry is entirely manual 
and dependent on the ACO, divisional administrative contracting officer (DACO), and 
corporate administrative contracting officer (CACO) to make timely updates related to 
contractor business systems (DCMA, 2019c).  
C. FUNCTIONAL SPECIALIST AND CONTRACTING OFFICER 
REPORTING 
The information captured from CBAR traces back to where the business system’s 
significant deficiency originated. The review of the DCMA findings reported from 
government business system compliance reviews provides the detailed analysis of the 
business system findings. The findings report is submitted to the assigned ACO for final 
business system disapproval determination. The analysis of the findings report and 
business system disapproval with “determination to withhold payments” determines the 
impact of withholding payments. The functional specialists provide the ACO with the CAR 
Level I, II, III, or IV; CAP; and CAP approval with verification of business system 
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compliance by the DCMA business system review functional specialist. Table 1 describes 
the CAR levels. 
 CAR Levels, Coordination, Approval, and 
Distribution Matrix. Adapted from DCMA (2019d). 
 
 
The analysis of the exhibits, contractual requirements, and contractor procedures 
with the noncompliance description from the CAR identifies the severity of the 
noncompliance and the impact. The analysis of the data provided by the contractor through 
a CAP provides the root cause of the significant deficiency, the corrective action plan 
implementation schedule, and the prevention of reoccurrence.  
Table 2 identifies DCMA’s required criteria for the contractors to include in their 
CAP prior to submitting to the functional specialist for approval. The CAP is evaluated on 
the basis of the necessary requirements by the functional specialist. If the CAP 
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requirements are deficient, is the CAP will be returned to the contractor for correction and 
resubmittal until it is approved by the functional specialist. Lastly, the DCMA business 
system review functional specialist verifies the exit criteria, prevention of reoccurrence, 
and closure of the CAP prior to submitting to the ACO for final determination of approved 
or disapproved CBS.  
 Required Criteria for CAR Response. 




On February 19, 2020, an analysis data set was retrieved on CAGE code entries 
from CBAR. There were 1,632 contractor CAGE entries for the six contractor business 
systems statused between 2015 and 2019. There were 1,600 contractor CAGEs with 
approved business systems and 32 with disapproved business systems that are described in 
Chapter IV. 
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IV. ANALYSIS  
This analysis examines the impact of clause 252.242.7005 Contractor Business 
System after the April 9, 2015, Implementation Directive for Better Buying Power 3.0: 
Achieving Dominant Capabilities through Technical Excellence and Innovation (Kendall, 
2015). The contracting officer is responsible for current, accurate, and timely entry of 
CAGE level status, for the six contractor business systems, into CBAR (DCMA, 2019c). 
Figures 4–11 represent the number of contractor business systems in each category that 
were statused as approved and disapproved in CBAR between 2015 and 2019.  
A. BUSINESS SYSTEM ANALYSIS 
(1) Approved and Disapproved Contractor Business Systems  
Figure 4 shows a total of 1,600 approved and 32 disapproved contractor business 
systems that were statused in CBAR. 
 
Figure 4. CBAR Contractor Business Systems with Approved 
(1,600) and Disapproved (32) Status, by Year, 2015–2019. 
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Figure 5 shows that between 2015 and 2019 there were 32 contractor business 
systems that had significant deficiencies and were disapproved by the contracting officer. 
Only three out of the 32 disapproved contractor business systems had a percentage of 
payments withheld. There were no disapproved contractor business systems in 2015 and 
2017.  
In 2016, there were five, and in 2019 there were 24 disapproved purchasing 
systems. Since 2016, one of the five purchasing systems had payments withheld by the 
contracting officer, and today all five systems remain disapproved with significant 
deficiencies. Between mid- to late-2019, none of the 24 disapproved systems had payments 
withheld, and today all remain disapproved with significant deficiencies. 
In 2018, there were three disapproved material management and accounting 
systems (MMAS), and two of the three had payments withheld by the contracting officer. 
All three contractor business systems remain disapproved with significant deficiencies. 
 
Figure 5. CBAR Contractor Business Systems with Disapproved (3) 
Material Management and Accounting systems and Disapproved 












B. ANALYSIS OF SIX CONTRACTOR BUSINESS SYSTEMS 
As stated previously, the analysis of the following six contractor business systems 
is used to answer the primary and secondary research questions. 
(1) Earned Value Management System (EVMS) 
Figure 6 shows that between 2015 and 2019 there were 365 records that are 
classified as 88 approved, nine not evaluated, and 268 that do not apply under the EVMS 
requirement. Although there were no disapproved EVMS, it is important to understand the 
execution of the EVMS review. There are two guides, one is for implementation and the 
other is for interpretation, from the Office of  “Acquisition Analytics and Policy 
(AAP).…is accountable for EVM Policy, oversight, and governance across the DOD” 
(AAP, 2019a, p. 1). The AAP Earned Value Management Implementation Guide (EVMIG) 
provides guidance for the EVM concepts, use, and application to contracts (AAP, 2019a, 
p. i). The AAP Earned Value Management System Interpretation Guide (EVMSIG) 
provides the “DOD interpretation of the 32 guidelines” (AAP, 2019b, p. 4). The  guidance 
for interpretation of EVM policy pertains to a number of internal and regulatory 
requirements, for example, 32 guidelines covered in the EIA-748-C Standard, “Earned 
Value Management Systems,” and DFARS 252.234-7002, as well as DFARS Subpart 
242.302, “Contract Administrations Functions, etc.” (AAP, 2019b, p. 90).  Additionally, 
the DCMA-MAN 2301–01, Section 5: Earned Value Management System, provides 
guidance related to a number of internal and regulatory requirements (2019c). 
The contractor must ensure they have the proper internal control tools and a formal 
documented process that includes standard business management practices. To this end, 
the contractor maintains internal controls documented in their EVM System Description 
(SD). The EVMS functional specialist must review and ensure that the contractor’s internal 
controls and business management practices comply with the 32 guidelines. The guidelines 
are divided into five areas. Each of the following areas are covered by specific guidelines: 
Organization⸺Guidelines 1−5; Planning, Scheduling, and Budgeting⸺Guidelines 6−15; 
Accounting Considerations⸺Guidelines 16−21; Analysis and Management Reporting⸺ 
Guidelines 22−27; and Revisions and Data Maintenance (AAP, 2019b, pp. 4−6).  
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The EVMS functional specialist documents compliance review deficiencies that do 
not support with DFARS 252.245-7002, as well as contractor-identified deficiencies on the 
contractor’s EVMS in the CAR eTool system. The same process described previously is 
used for issuing a CAR and approving the contractor’s CAP, as well as for significant 
deficiencies and reapproval of the contractor’s business system. 
 
Figure 6. CBAR Contractor Business Systems with Approved (88), Not Evaluated 
(9), Not Applicable (268), and Disapproved (0) Earned Value Management 
Systems Status by Year, 2015-2019. 
(2) Property Management System 
Figure 7 shows that between 2015 and 2019 there were 459 records that are 
classified as 356 approved, seven not evaluated, and 96 that do not apply under the property 
management systems requirement. Although there were no disapproved property 
management systems, it is important to understand the execution of the property 
management system analysis (PMSA). The DCMA Guidebook, Contract Property 
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Administration, provides guidance that pertains to a number of internal and regulatory 
requirements, such as DFARS 252.245-7003, FAR 52.245-1, etc.  Additionally, The 
DCMA-MAN 2301–01, Section 7: Property Management System, provides guidance 
related to a number of internal and regulatory requirements (2019c). 
The contractor must ensure they have a process to manage government property 
effectively and efficiently. The responsibility of the contracting officer is to determine 
whether the contractor’s property management system is acceptable based on analysis 
results of a compliance review, that is conducted and reported, by the government property 
administrator (PA) (DCMA, 2020): “The Government shall have access to the Contractor’s 
premises and all Government property” (DCMA, 2020, p. 3). The PA functional specialist 
must ensure the contractor has the proper internal controls to effectively and efficiently 
manage the government’s property.  
The PA is responsible for accessing the contract to ensure the appropriate clauses 
and property attachments with terms and conditions are included. Additionally, the PA is 
responsible for reviewing, testing, and documenting the contractor risk rating by using the 
methodologies of “22 elements.” These elements are reviewed at least once every three 
years (DCMA, 2020, p. 14). 
The PA functional specialist documents compliance review deficiencies that do not 
support DFARS 252.245-7003, as well as contractor-identified deficiencies on the 
contractor’s property management system in the CAR eTool system. The same process 
described previously is used for issuing a CAR and approving the contractor’s CAP, as 






Figure 7. CBAR Contractor Business Systems with  Approved (356), Not Evaluated 
(7), and Not Applicable (96), and Disapproved (0) Property Management 
Systems Status by Year, 2015-2019. 
(3) Contractor Purchasing System Review (CPSR) 
Figure 8 shows that between 2015 and 2019 there were 481 records that are 
classified as 364 approved, 29 disapproved, three not evaluated, and 96 that do not apply 
under the CPSR requirement. There were 29 disapproved purchasing systems, and 1 out of 
the 29 had payments withheld. All 29 remain disapproved with significant deficiencies. It 
is important to understand the execution of the CPSR, as well as documented significant 
deficiencies. The DCMA Guidebook, Contractor Purchasing System Review, provides 
guidance that pertains to a number of internal and regulatory requirements, such as DCMA 
Instruction 109, FAR subpart 44.3, DFARS 252.244-7001, etc., (2019, p. 5). Additionally, 
The DCMA-MAN 2301–01, Section 8: Purchasing System, provides guidance related to a 
number of internal and regulatory requirements (2019c). 
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The CPSR functional specialist must ensure the contractor’s purchasing system has 
the proper internal controls to effectively and efficiently manage the expenditure of 
government funds. To that end, they review the contractor’s purchasing system at a 
minimum of every three years. They ensure the contractor is in compliance with 30 
elements that pertain to the review of the purchasing system.  
The functional specialist documents compliance review deficiencies, as well as 
contractor-identified deficiencies, on the purchasing system that do not support DFARS 
252.244-7001(c), in the CAR eTool system. The same process described previously is used 
for issuing a CAR and approving the contractor’s CAP, as well as for significant 
deficiencies and reapproval of the contractor’s business system. 
Between 2015 and 2019, there were 29 disapproved purchasing systems. A review 
of the cost and pricing area, in a random selection, of disapproved CPSRs showed a 
consistency of significant deficiencies related to cost and/or price analysis. These were 
related to contractor performance cost and pricing data as required by DFARS 252.244-
7001(c). The analysis of cost and pricing is required to be completed and documented on 
all appropriate purchase orders, revisions, and adjustments as defined by the guidelines in 
FAR 15.404-1. This ensures the fair and reasonableness of the final price (2019, p. 55). 
The cost of pricing deficiencies create a higher cost of contractor purchases, which is 




Figure 8. CBAR Contractor Business Systems with  Approved (364), 
Not Evaluated (3), Not Applicable (85),  and  Disapproved 
(29) Purchasing Systems Status by Year, 2015-2019. 
(4) Accounting Systems  
As Figure 9 shows, between 2015 and 2019 there were 362 records that are 
classified as 324 approved, three not evaluated, and 35 that do not apply under the 
accounting system requirement. It is important to understand the execution of the 
accounting system review. The DCMA Manual 2301–01, Contractor Business System, 
section 3, Accounting System, provides guidance related to a number of internal and 
regulatory requirements, such as DFARS 252.242-706, DFARS 242.75, etc. (2019c).  
Additionally, The DCMA-MAN 2301–01, Section 3: Accounting System, provides 
guidance related to a number of internal and regulatory requirements (2019c). “DCAA or 
a Host Nation Audit Organization (HNAO) generally conducts accounting system reviews 
and issues the business system report to the [DCMA administrative contracting officer] 






request an accounting system review be conducted by DCAA when the contractor’s 
accounting system has not been approved (2019c). 
The DCAA functional specialist must review the contractor’s accounting system to 
ensure that it complies with the government regulations and laws, the cost data is reliable, 
the risk related to errors in allocations and charges are controlled, and they are reliable with 
internal billing practices that are required by DFARS 252.242-7006(a)(1). The accounting 
system is further defined by DFARS 252.242-7006(a)(2) as “the contractor’s accounting 
system or systems for accounting methods, procedures, and controls established to gather, 
record, classify, analyze, summarize, interpret, and present accurate and timely financial 
data for reporting in compliance with applicable laws, regulations, and management 
decisions” (2012).  
Specifically, the functional specialist determines allowability by reviewing the 
accounting system to ensure the total contract costs are allowable and reasonable under 
FAR 32.201-2 (2020). These contract costs include direct and indirect expenses (material, 
manufacturing, engineering, and site overhead), general expenses, and administrative 
expenses. Additionally, the functional specialist completes a review of the accounting 
system to ensure unallowable costs are not charged on government contracts as required 
by FAR 31, Contract Cost Principles and Procedures (2020).  
The DCAA functional specialist documents compliance review deficiencies, as 
well as contractor-identified deficiencies, in a business system report that is sent to the 
DCMA ACO. The ACO is responsible for documenting the deficiencies in the CAR eTool. 
The ACO in coordination with the DCAA functional specialist approved the contractor’s 
CAP. The contractor notifies the ACO when the corrective actions are complete and ready 
for validation that there are no significant deficiencies. The ACO coordinates with DCAA 
to review the contractor’s accounting system to verify there are no remaining deficiencies. 
When DCAA provides the contracting officer with the contractor’s business system report 






Figure 9. CBAR Contractor Business Systems with  Approved (324), 
Not Evaluated (3), Not Applicable (35), and Disapproved (0) 
Accounting Systems Status by Year, 2015-2019. 
(5) Cost Estimating Systems 
Figure 10 shows that between 2015 and 2019 there were 387 records that are 
classified as 310 approved, six not evaluated, and 71 that do not apply under the cost 
estimating requirement. It is important to understand the execution of the cost estimating 
system review. The DCMA-MAN 2301–01, Section 4: Cost Estimating System, provides 
guidance related to a number of internal and regulatory requirements, such as DFARS 
252.242-7002, DFARS 215.407-5-70(b), etc. (2019c).  
“DCAA or a Host Nation Audit Organization (HNAO) generally conducts cost 
estimating system reviews with input from the DCMA functional specialists, and issues 
business system reports to the [DCMA administrative contracting officer] ACO” (2019c, 
p. 11). The ACO is responsible for surveillance and has the authority to request that a 
DCMA functional specialist perform a cost estimating system review. Also, the ACO can 
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request a review be conducted by DCAA when the contractor’s cost estimating system has 
not been approved (2019c). The surveillance ensures that “estimating systems must be 
consistent and integrated with the contractor’s related management systems and be subject 
to applicable financial control systems pursuant to DFARS 252.242-7002” (DCMA, 
2019c, p. 11). A compliant cost estimating system increases the efficiency, effectiveness, 
and  “accuracy and reliability of individual proposals” (2019c, p. 11). 
 
Figure 10. CBAR Contractor Business Systems with  Approved (310), 
Not Evaluated (6), Not Applicable (71), and Disapproved (0) 
Estimating Systems Status by Year, 2015-2019. 
(6) Material Management and Accounting System (MMAS) 
Figure 11 shows that between 2015 and 2019 there were 400 records that are 
classified as 158 approved, three disapproved, 11 not evaluated, and 228 that do not apply 
under the MMAS requirement. It is important to understand the execution of the accounting 
system review. The DCMA-MAN 2301–01, Section 6: Material Management and 
32 
Accounting System, provides guidance related to a number of internal and regulatory 
requirements, such as DFARS 252.242-7004, DFARS 242.72, etc. (DCMA, 2019c).  
The ACO is responsible for surveillance and is authorized to request a review of 
the contractor’s MMAS. The surveillance ensures “a compliant MMAS maintains effective 
planning, controlling, and accounting for the acquisition, use, issuance, and disposition of 
materials as prescribed in DFARS 252.242-7004” (DCMA, 2019a, p 15). Additionally, 
DFARS 252.242-7004(d)(5) stipulates a maintainable recorded inventory reconciliation at 
a “95% accuracy level as desirable” (DCAA, 2020, p. 23). If the” accuracy level falls below 
95% the, contractor shall provide” evidence that validates there is no quantifiable harm to 
the government (DCAA, 2020, p. 23). 
In 2018, there were three disapproved MMAS, and two of the three had payments 
withheld by the contracting officer. A review of the inventory area, in a random selection, 
of disapproved contractor MMAS reviews showed a consistency of significant inventory 
deficiencies. The internal policy, procedures, and controls to efficiently and effectively 
maintain an adequate level of inventory was either nonexistent or was not practiced. All 
three contractor business systems remain disapproved with significant deficiencies. A 
compliant MMAS protects the government from excess/residual inventories, ineffective 
and untimely release of purchase orders, lost or found parts, etc. (DCMA, 2019a). 
The DCAA functional specialist documents compliance review deficiencies, as 
well as contractor-identified deficiencies, in a business system report that is sent to the 
DCMA ACO. The ACO is responsible for documenting the deficiencies in the CAR eTool. 
The ACO in coordination with the DCAA functional specialist approved the contractor’s 
CAP. The contractor notifies the ACO when the corrective actions are complete and ready 
for validation that there are no significant deficiencies. The ACO coordinates with DCAA 
to review the contractor’s MMAS to verify there are not remaining deficiencies. When 
DCAA provides the contracting officer with the contractor’s business system report that 




Figure 11. CBAR Contractor Business Systems with  Approved (158),  
Not Evaluated (11), Not Applicable (228), and Disapproved 
(3) Material Management And Accounting Systems Status by 
Year, 2015-2019. 
C. SUMMARY 
The primary research question: What is the impact of recent changes to the 
compliance determination of the contractor business systems after the April 9, 2015, 
implementation of Better Buying Power 3.0: Achieving Dominant Capabilities through 
Technical Excellence and Innovation (Kendall, 2015)? 
The answer to the primary research question revealed there was no impact to the 
government, contractor, and warfighter related to DFARS clause 252.242.7005 (2012). 
The government improvement measures were not used by the contracting officer to enforce 
contractor payment withholds on 29 of the 32 disapproved systems. The research project 




The data collected included 1,632 contractor CAGEs. There were 1,600 approved and 32 
with disapproved contractor business systems.  
The secondary research question: What has a direct impact to fielding supplies to 
the warfighter?  
The answer to the secondary research question was not revealed. However, it is 
believed further research on CARs, written on significant deficiencies related to 
production, quality, and manufacturing, would provide the answer. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS  
As Robert Burns (2009) wrote, “the best-laid plans of mice and men oft go astray” 
(p. 48), which describes the results of this thesis’s primary research question, specifically, 
the impact of DFARS 252.242.7005, which was designed with the intent to get critical 
supplies fielded to the warfighter faster, better, and cheaper. As discussed in the opening 
chapters of this thesis, on January 15, 2010, the intent of DOD policy-makers in proposing 
Business Case 2009-D038, which later became law in 2012 as DFARS 252.242.7005, was 
“to improve the effectiveness of DCMA and DCAA oversight of contractor business 
systems” (Federal Register, 2010, p. 2,457). This law gave contracting officers the 
mechanism to enforce compliance on deficient systems by withholding a contractors 
payments. The withhold can not “exceed 5 percent for any single business system or 10 
percent for two or more CBS that have been disapproved” (DCMA, 2019c, p. 37). As the 
deficiencies were corrected, the contracting officer could reduce the percentage of the 
payments withheld until there were no remaining deficiencies and contractor business 
system was reapproved (DCMA, 2019a).  
As previously stated, on June 28, 2010, the government’s improvement efforts 
started with a memorandum from Dr. Ashton Carter, under secretary of defense for 
acquisition, technology, and logistics, on Better Buying Power: Mandate for Restoring 
Affordability and Productivity in Defense Spending (2010a). Carter emphasized President 
Obama and Secretary Gates’s priority to “support our forces at war on an urgent basis” 
(2010a, p. 1). Between 2010 and 2015, this priority was initiated and implemented through 
Carter and Kendall’s Better Buying Power Initiative, “delivering better value to the 
taxpayer and improving the way the Department does business” (2010a, p. 1). However, 
upon analysis of these various policies, memorandums, and laws, via contractor case study 
data, this researcher concluded there was no impact on a disapproved contractor business 
system or associated penalties in terms of continued government contracts and 
relationships. Therefore, there continues to be no impact of these requirements in 
improving contractor business systems compliance, government cost and efficiency, and 
warfighter readiness.  
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A. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This research produced three main findings and corresponding recommendations  
for effectively and efficiently provide contract oversight and ensure that contractor data is 
current, accurate, and timely. Essentially, in order to address and reduce risk management, 
the implementation of an integrated CAR and CBAR repository is required. The integrated 
system would track historical data, responsibilities, and action due dates of the contractor 
officer and functional specialist responsibilities, and actions on significant deficiencies 
related to production, quality, and manufacturing (PQM). The three findings and 
corresponding recommendations are as follows: 
a. Finding 1: Analysis between 2015 and 2019 of the CBAR data for the six 
contractor business systems revealed that once a business system is 
reapproved there is no method to view historical data of past deficiencies.  
b. Recommended: Integrated Data Repository  
It is recommended that the CAR and CBAR tools are integrated and maintained by 
the responsible authorities. A systematic feature of the repository would be to track the 
time from initiation to closure of all approved and disapproved systems. This would 
provide visibility and warrant action to verify and validate the timely closure of significant 
deficiencies.  
c. Finding 2: The data analysis revealed the lack of a responsibility tracking 
tool.  
d. Recommended: Track Contracting Officer and Functional Specialist 
Responsibilities 
It is recommended that an integrated decision tool is needed to track the 
responsibilities of contracting officers and functional specialist. This would be enable the 
contracting officer and functional specialist, as well as internal and external customers, to 
track responsibilities, actions, and closures. A decision tool that is integrated with the CAR 
and CBAR tool would provide visibility of the contracting officer and functional specialist 
responsibilities, as this would ensure current, accurate, and timely actions. 
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e. Finding 3: The CARs that were analyzed on the disapproved contractor
business systems did not impact the urgent fielding of critical supplies,
services, and lifesaving equipment with better value and rapid fielding to
U.S. armed forces (Gates, 2014).
f. Recommended: DFARS Amendment to Production, Quality, and
Manufacturing (PQM)
It is recommended that the DOD propose a rule, to amend the DFARS, that would 
improve the effectiveness of DOD contract compliance oversight related to significant 
deficiencies related to PQM. The amendment to the DFARS would provide a requirement 
for risk mitigation, subject to penalties for non-compliance, on delivery delays and 
nonconforming material. It is urgent to add these improvement measures in the next NDAA 
FY21, as this would reduce warfighter readiness impacts. 
B. FUTURE RESEARCH CONSIDERATION: RECOMMENDATIONS AND
THE SECTION 809 PANEL REPORT
Based on this research, it is clear that more contract compliance oversight reform
is needed. Therefore, it is recommended that future research revisit the previously 
discussed corrective actions and the recommendations of the 2016 Section 809 panel report 
regarding streamlining government processes. Their findings stressed that DOD contract 
compliance oversight lacks consistent timeliness, efficiency, and effectiveness. The panel 
provided recommendation 7 (Volume 1, Section 2, p. 70): “Provide flexibility to 
contracting officers and auditors to use audit and advisory services when appropriate.”  
If the corrective actions and recommendations are researched, it would highlight 
measures and impacts that were created and implemented by DOD policy-makers. Jim 
Mattis, the 26th U.S. secretary of defense, best described the intent of government reform 
in the publication of the Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United 
States of America when he said it is to “transition to a culture of performance where results 
and accountability matter … prioritize speed of delivery … and empowering the warfighter 
with the knowledge, equipment and support systems to fight and win” (Mattis, 2018, p. 
10). 
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C.   FY21 NDAA BILL, CHAIRMAN’S MARK
On July 1, 2020, there were three CBS measures documented in the House
Committee on Armed Services in the H.R. 6395-FY21 NDAA Bill, Chairman’s Mark 
(NDAA Bill, 2020). The Bill was named after Texas Congressman, William M. (MAC) 
Thornberry and if it is not amended by the House or Senate, would become law with the 
Presidents signature (NDAA, 2020).  
The first measure by the Committee On Armed Services House Of Representatives 
would direct the Comptroller General to make an assessment of DCAA and DCMA 
improving “their execution, management, and oversight of [CBS] reviews, including their 
use of [Independent Public Accountants] IPAs” (2020b, p. 168). The second measure by 
the Committee corresponds with the Section 809 Panel Report, Volume 3 (Rec. 72, 2019). 
The Committee recommends streamlining the DOD by reviewing the government 
evaluation criteria, “internal control audit framework used to evaluate contractor business 
systems” (2020b, p. 170). This review would verify whether it is more efficient and 
effective to use an auditing framework consistent with the private industry auditing 
standards instead of the DFARS standard used by the government (2020b). The third 
measure by the Committee corresponds with the Section 809 Panel Report, Volume 3 ( 
Rec. 73, 2019). This measure would “amend section 893 of the Ike Skelton for FY 2011 
(Public Law 111-383; note 2302 of title 10, United States Code) by replacing ‘significant 
deficiency’ with the term ‘material weakness.’” (2020b, p. 177).  
In theory, if the first and second measures become law, they would increase 
efficiency, effectiveness, and reduce expenses for government oversight of contractor 
business systems. However, if the third measure becomes law, the language change of 
noncompliance from “significant deficiency” to “material weakness” could potentially 
obscure notable contractor performance system issues, and therefore weaken the current 
DFARS regulation (2020b, p. 177).  
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APPENDIX.  CONTRACTOR BUSINESS SYSTEM RULE 
CONTRACT APPLICATION  
DFARS 252.242-7000 Contractor business system deficiencies states:  
 
“Covered contract” means a contract that is subject to the Cost 
Accounting Standards under 41 U.S.C. chapter 15, as implemented in 
regulations found at 48 CFR 9903.201-1 (see the FAR Appendix) (10 
U.S.C. 2302 note, as amended by section 816 of Public Law 112-81). 
 
“Significant deficiency” is defined in the clause at 252.242-7005, 
Contractor Business Systems.  
 
 (b) Determination to withhold payments. If the contracting officer 
makes a final determination to disapprove a contractor’s Business System 
in accordance with the clause at 252.242-7005, Contractor Business 
Systems, the contracting officer shall—  
 
(1) In accordance with agency procedures, identify one or more 
covered contracts containing the clause at 252.242-7005, 
Contractor Business Systems, from which payments will be 
withheld. When identifying the covered contracts from which to 
withhold payments…” 
 
1. Contract Administration Functions 
2. PCO Delegation and can withhold all but 42.302⸺Contract 
Administration Functions to DCMA 
“3.1. GENERAL GUIDANCE. CRR is the process by which 
DCMA receives and reviews contracts and modifications to identify 
customer requirements for CAS. Assignment of contract 
administration and functions are governed by FAR Subpart 42.202, 
FAR Subpart 42.302, DFARS Subpart 242.202, and DFARS 
Subpart 242.302 (see References on the Resource Page). 
 
a. DCMA receives requests for CAS support that either meet 
mission requirements (core work) or don’t meet mission 
requirements (non-core work). DCMA’s core mission work is 
directed and funded by the Office of the Secretary of Defense to 
provide CAS in support of the Military Services and DOD agencies 
(mission customers) as well as other federal agencies, foreign 
governments and international organizations as authorized in 
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accordance with DODD 5105.64. Requests to perform non-core 
work must be processed in accordance with paragraph 3.5.c. of this 
manual. b. DCMA Functional Specialists performing CRR must be 
familiar with the process and tools for identifying and addressing 
core work and non-core work. c. Complete to include cross 
functional/multifunctional/integrated review. 3.2. CONTRACT 
RECEIPT. In accordance with DFARS Procedures, Guidance, and 
Information (PGI) 204.201(3)(i), issuing offices must distribute 
contracts and modifications electronically. DCMA retrieves 
electronic information for contracts and modifications that have 
been assigned to DCMA for administration to populate its systems 
to begin the contract administration process”(DCMA, 2019a). 
3. SUBPART 42.302—Contract Administration Functions 
The contracting officer normally delegates the following contract 
administration functions to a CAO. The contracting officer may 
retain any of these functions, except those in paragraphs (a)(5), 
(a)(9), (a)(11) and (a)(12) of this section, unless the cognizant 
Federal agency (see 2.101) has designated the contracting officer to 
perform these functions.(FAR -- Part 42 Contract Administration 
and Audit Services, n.d.-b) 
4. DCMA Contract Administration Services (CAS) 
1.2. POLICY. It is DCMA policy to: a. Conduct an initial review of 
contracts assigned to DCMA within 30 calendar days of receipt. 
This review assures contracts are correctly assigned as well as 
identifies contract requirements for which DCMA Functional 
Specialists provide surveillance and oversight of contract 
compliance. b. Ensure functional specialists properly review, 
identify, and document contract requirements associated with their 
area of responsibility. c. Conduct Contract Receipt and Review 
(CRR) consistent with Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 
Subpart 42.201, Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation 
Supplement (DFARS) Subpart 242.202, DOD Directive 5105.64, 
and DCMA Instruction (DCMA-INST) 2501, “Contract 
Maintenance.” d. Promote an environment of cross functional 
integration during requirements identification. e. Execute this 
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